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NOTES
JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF STATE ETHICS
RULES UNDER THE MCDADE AMENDMENT:
DO FEDERAL OR STATE COURTS GET
THE LAST WORD?
Hopi Costello*
The McDade Amendment (“the Act”) is a federal law that requires
federal prosecutors to abide by the state ethics rules of the jurisdiction in
which they practice. The Act does not say, however, whether federal or
state courts are definitive when it comes to interpreting state ethics rules as
they apply to federal prosecutors. Those testifying before Congress raised
this issue and noted that the Act left the issue unresolved. Despite this,
Congress did not address this matter in either its legislative history or in
the Act itself. No court has tackled this question and scholarship attends to
it only in passing. At this time, both federal and state courts interpret state
ethics rules as they apply to federal prosecutors.
As it currently stands, with both court systems interpreting the rules and
no determination as to which is definitive, federal prosecutors must comply
with both federal and state court interpretations. This is likely to chill
federal prosecutors in the exercise of their official duties because they are
bound to be unsure of the rules they must abide by. More importantly,
concurrent interpretation creates unsolvable conflicts when a federal and
state court in the same jurisdiction interpret the same rule differently.
This Note explores whether federal or state courts’ interpretations of
state ethics rules are definitive as applied to federal prosecutors under the
McDade Amendment. It considers the plain text of the Act, its legislative
history, and the purposes and policies of the legislation. Ultimately, this
Note argues that the legal community should regard state courts’
interpretations as definitive. This Note concludes by proposing a
framework for federal courts to defer to state courts’ interpretations of
ethics rules as they apply to federal prosecutors.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2012, the Kentucky Bar Association (KBA) promulgated an ethics
advisory opinion finding that the use of ineffective assistance of counsel
waivers (“IAC waivers”) in plea agreements violates both prosecutors’ and
defense attorneys’ ethical obligations under the Kentucky Rules of
Professional Conduct.1 The KBA prohibited all prosecutors practicing in

1. See Ky. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. E-435 (2012). The majority of state ethics boards that
have considered the issue have reached the same conclusion. For an in-depth analysis of
state ethics boards’ opinions regarding IAC waivers, see Peter A. Joy & Rodney J. Uphoff,
Systemic Barriers to Effective Assistance of Counsel in Plea Bargaining, 99 IOWA L. REV.
2103 (2014). For a detailed analysis of the situation in Kentucky specifically, see Michelle
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the state, including federal prosecutors, from requesting or requiring such
waivers as part of a plea agreement.2 For the following two years, federal
prosecutors ignored the KBA’s opinion and continued to include IAC
waivers in plea agreements.3 They did so even though federal legislation
referred to as the McDade Amendment4 (or, “the Act”) requires federal
prosecutors to abide by state ethics rules in the jurisdiction where they
practice.5 The United States Attorneys argued that the KBA’s opinion
conflicted with federal law, which allows IAC waivers.6 The federal
prosecutors also claimed that “the KBA’s opinion was an unreasonable
interpretation of the ethics rules.”7 Additionally, the KBA’s opinion was
only advisory.8
In 2014, the Supreme Court of Kentucky intervened.9 The state’s highest
court concluded that, under the McDade Amendment, federal prosecutors
must abide by the KBA’s prohibition of IAC waivers in plea agreements.10
The Kentucky Supreme Court reached this conclusion by interpreting a
number of state ethics rules. Nowhere do the Kentucky ethics rules
explicitly prohibit IAC waivers; rather, the state court read certain ethics
rules as prohibiting this particular attorney conduct.11
After the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision, federal courts in that
jurisdiction had a choice of whether to accept plea bargains that included
IAC waivers. Federal courts could either defer to the state court’s
interpretation of the ethics rules that IAC waivers were not allowed or
decide on their own whether IAC waivers breached attorneys’ ethical
duties. Federal courts in Kentucky avoided having to make this choice
because soon after the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision, formerAttorney General Eric Holder (“AG Holder”) announced that federal

Harrison, Under Attack: The De-Legitimization of State Ethics Rules in the Face of
Prosecutorial Discretion, 27 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 521 (2014).
2. See Ky. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. E-435 at 1.
3. See, e.g., Reply Brief for Petitioner at 1–2, United States v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439
S.W.3d 136 (Ky. 2014) (No. 2013-SC-000270), 2013 WL 4736435, at *1 (arguing that the
KBA opinion should be vacated).
4. The McDade Amendment was enacted with the Citizens Protection Act and has the
subtitle “Ethical standards for attorneys for the Government.” See 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2012).
This Note refers to the amendment as both the “McDade Amendment” and “the Act.” For
an explanation of the Act, see infra Part I.A.3.
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B.
6. See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 3, at 1. The majority of the federal
appellate courts hold that IAC waivers are enforceable as long as they are knowing and
voluntary. For a discussion of the federal courts’ opinions, see Nancy J. King, Plea
Bargains That Waive Claims of Ineffective Assistance—Waiving Padilla and Frye, 51 DUQ.
L. REV. 647, 651–55 (2013).
7. Reply Brief for Petitioner, supra note 3, at 1.
8. See Howland W. Abramson & Gary Lee, Judicial Ethics Advisory Committees
Should Render Opinions Which Adhere to Binding United States Constitutional Precedents,
41 DUQ. L. REV. 269, 269 n.1 (2003) (“[S]uch judicial ethics advisory opinions are not
binding . . . .”).
9. See United States v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d 136 (Ky. 2014).
10. See id. at 157–58.
11. See id. at 152–57.
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prosecutors would no longer seek IAC waivers.12 This effectively mooted
the issue in Kentucky.13
However, it is inevitable that this issue will arise again, with different
prosecutorial conduct and different state ethics rules. When it does, the
federal court will have to decide whether to defer to the state court’s
interpretation of the ethics rule or to interpret the rule itself. The answer to
how federal courts should proceed in this scenario depends on whether
federal courts’ or state courts’ interpretations of state ethics rules are
definitive under the McDade Amendment.
The McDade Amendment requires federal prosecutors to follow state
ethics rules.14 However, the Act does not say whether federal prosecutors
must also abide by state courts’ interpretations of those rules.15 Currently,
both federal and state courts interpret state ethics rules as they apply to
federal prosecutors.16 Therefore, the question arises: Must federal courts
defer to state courts’ interpretations of ethics rules or may they interpret
these rules themselves? Put another way, do federal courts or state courts
get the last word when it comes to interpreting state ethics rules as they
apply to federal prosecutors under the McDade Amendment?
This question was discussed when the McDade Amendment was enacted,
but it has not been resolved.17 In a hearing before the House of
Representatives, Seth Waxman, then-Associate Deputy Attorney General,
explicitly asked, “Whose interpretation of the bar rules will count for
purposes of enforcement?”18 Waxman pointed out that the Act did not
address this question.19 He stated, “[T]he bill leaves [this question] open,
and confused.”20 Waxman went on to say, “These are not easy questions. I
raise them not because I have the answers, but because the answers are
necessary to any consideration of this bill.”21 There was no further

12. See Joe Palazzolo, Government Rethinks Waivers with Guilty Pleas, WALL STREET.
J. (Sept. 26, 2014, 12:19 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/u-s-government-seeks-to-curbappeals-over-bad-legal-advice-1411745218 [http://perma.cc/P7VR-CMJ3].
13. Although unlikely, Kentucky could still bring disciplinary proceedings against
United States Attorneys who included IAC waivers in plea agreements prior to AG Holder’s
announcement because there is no statute of limitations on attorney discipline. See 7A C.J.S.
Attorney & Client § 125 (2004) (“General statutes of limitations are not applicable to
disciplinary proceedings.”).
14. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2012). For a detailed explanation of the Act, see infra Part
I.A.3.
15. See infra Part II.A.
16. See infra Part I.B.
17. See infra Part II.B.
18. Ethical Standards for Federal Prosecutors Act of 1996: Hearing on H.R. 3386
Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. of the
Judiciary, 104th Cong. 47 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 Legislative Hearings] (statement of Seth
P. Waxman, Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice).
19. See id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
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discussion on this point.22 No court has resolved this question and the
academic literature has addressed it only in passing.23
Federal prosecutors can either abide by the state court ethics rules as
interpreted by state courts or they can abide by these rules as interpreted by
federal courts. As it stands now, with no answer as to which interpretation
is definitive and both court systems interpreting the rules, federal
prosecutors must abide by both. This has the potential to create irresolvable
conflicts. Having to abide by two sets of interpretations is likely to chill
federal prosecutors in the exercise of their official duties and confusion over
which rules to follow will hinder them in prosecuting to the fullest extent of
the law.24 Additionally, there is no solution for when federal and state
interpretations clash. Therefore, it is imperative that the legal community
regard either federal or state courts as the definitive source for judicial
interpretation of ethics rules as they apply to federal prosecutors under the
McDade Amendment.
This Note explores the puzzle of whether federal or state courts’
interpretations of ethics rules are definitive under the McDade Amendment.
Part I describes how federal prosecutors are regulated in general and under
the McDade Amendment and illustrates that both federal and state courts
interpret state ethics rules. Part II lays out the problems with federal and
state courts interpreting the same ethics rules and explores the arguments in
favor of both regarding federal and state courts’ interpretations as
definitive. Part III argues that, considering the underlying purposes and
policies of the McDade Amendment, federal courts should defer to state
courts’ interpretations of state ethics rules.
I. REGULATING FEDERAL PROSECUTORS:
ETHICS RULES AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS
There is a long history of ethical regulation of attorneys in the United
States.25 The American Bar Association (ABA) first adopted ethics
regulations, called the Cannons of Professional Ethics, in 1908.26 Since
then, the ABA, states, and federal courts have all participated in the ethical
regulation of attorneys, including federal prosecutors. This section
discusses how federal prosecutors are regulated, both through ethics rules
and through judicial interpretations of these rules. First, Part I.A discusses
the ethics rules that apply to federal prosecutors. Next, Part I.B describes
how both federal and state courts interpret these rules as they pertain to
federal prosecutors.
22. See id.
23. See sources cited infra note 198.
24. Cf. infra notes 223–27 and accompanying text (explaining that this was the case
before Congress enacted the McDade Amendment because federal prosecutors were
similarly unsure of which interpretations of ethics rules applied to them).
25. See generally David Ray Papke, The Legal Profession and Its Ethical
Responsibilities: A History, in ETHICS AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 35, 36 (Michael Davis &
Frederick A. Elliston eds., 1986).
26. See id. at 47.

206

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

A. Regulating Federal Prosecutors Through Ethics Rules
This section explains the number of mechanisms that regulate federal
prosecutors. Part I.A.1 briefly discusses the general framework for
regulating attorney ethics as it existed before the McDade Amendment and
as it still exists separate from the Act. Part I.A.2 describes the historical
background that led to the McDade Amendment. Finally, Part I.A.3
explains the McDade Amendment and how it changed the ethical regulation
and obligations of federal prosecutors.
1. Attorney Ethics Regulation Separate from the McDade Amendment
In the United States, state courts primarily regulate attorneys.27 For
example, state courts admit lawyers to the bar, create attorney ethics rules,
and discipline attorneys who do not comply with their rules.28 For the most
part, state courts adopt rules promulgated by the ABA, or at least rely on
these rules in crafting their own regulations.29 State courts generally have a
single code of ethics rules that regulates attorney conduct.30 States’ ethics
authorities may discipline attorneys who violate these rules while practicing
within the state.31
Federal courts also regulate attorney conduct. Unlike most state courts,32
“federal courts have no uniform or focused approach” to regulating attorney
ethics.33 Rather, federal courts do so through a variety of methods.34 These
methods fall into two main categories: First, federal courts may enact rules
governing attorney conduct. Second, federal courts regulate attorney ethics
through common law decision making.35
Federal courts may promulgate ethics rules for attorneys practicing in
federal court.36 This includes federal prosecutors.37 Despite federal courts’
authority to develop rules of conduct for attorneys appearing before them,
federal courts primarily regulate their attorneys through state ethics rules.38
For instance, federal district courts largely adopt state courts’ ethics rules
into their own local court rules.39 The extent to which federal courts adopt
27. See Bruce A. Green, Prosecutors and Professional Regulation, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 873, 875 (2012) (“Regulation of the bar in the United States has principally been the
province of state courts . . . .”).
28. See id.
29. See id. at 875–76.
30. See Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Regulating Federal Prosecutors’ Ethics,
55 VAND. L. REV. 381, 400 (2002).
31. See id. at 391 n.17.
32. See supra text accompanying note 30.
33. Green & Zacharias, supra note 30, at 400.
34. See id.
35. See Judith A. McMorrow & Daniel R. Coquillette, The Federal Law of Attorney
Conduct, in MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 8, § 801.02 (3d ed. 2006).
36. See Green, supra note 27, at 875.
37. See id.
38. See id. See generally McMorrow & Coquillette, supra note 35, § 8.
39. As of 2006, eighty-four of the ninety-four federal district courts had adopted the
state ethics rules of the jurisdiction in which they are located into their local rules. See
McMorrow & Coquillette, supra note 35, § 802.02[1]. Conversely, as of 2010, only six
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state ethics rules differs among courts.40 Some district courts adopt
wholesale the standards of the state in which the district court is located,
including any future changes made by the state.41 Others adopt the state
standards only as they exist at a fixed point in time.42 Still others adopt
certain state ethics rules but do not adopt them all.43 In addition, states
have authority to apply their own ethics rules to federal attorneys who work
within their borders.44 Therefore, even though federal courts have authority
to promulgate rules for their own district, in practice the state ethics rules
are often in effect.
Important for the purposes of this Note is how federal courts that adopt
state ethics rules approach judicial interpretation of those rules. Some such
federal district courts view themselves as free to interpret the state ethics
rules when there is no state authority directly on point.45 In these districts,
if a state court has interpreted the rule in a prior case, the federal court feels
constrained “to exercise Erie style deference to state authority.”46 On the
other hand, if the state court has not interpreted the rule, the federal court
will interpret the rule itself.47
However, the majority of federal district courts that have adopted state
ethics rules do not take this approach.48 Rather, when adopting state ethics
rules, most federal district courts do not also adopt the state courts’
interpretation of these rules.49 Some federal district courts adopt the state
ethics rules but in doing so plainly state that they reserve the right to
interpret these rules themselves.50 Other federal courts explicitly state that
they are adopting only the state’s ethics rules.51
Therefore, before Congress enacted the McDade Amendment, deciding
which court system should interpret state ethics rules in a particular federal
court would have been an easy inquiry. The only information required was
whether the federal district court had adopted the state rules and, if so,

district courts had adopted no state ethics rules. See id. § 801.02 (citing the Western District
of Wisconsin as an example, where ethical issues are dealt with “on an ad hoc basis with
complete discretion in the judge . . . ”).
40. See McMorrow & Coquillette, supra note 35, § 801.02 (explaining that “some
federal courts have adopted very few rules, or none at all, governing attorney conduct” and
that others essentially adopt the state rules wholesale).
41. See id. § 802.02[1].
42. See id. § 802.02[2].
43. See id.
44. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 30, at 391 & n.17 (citing Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Johnson, 770 A.2d 130, 148 (Md. 2001), as an example).
45. See McMorrow & Coquillette, supra note 35, § 802.02[1].
46. See id.
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. See, e.g., S.D.N.Y. R. 1.5 (specifying that the federal court will use the state rules
exclusively as “interpreted and applied by the United States Supreme Court, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, and this court”).
51. See W. DIST. PA. R. 83.3 (explicitly adopting only the state rules).
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whether it had also adopted the state’s interpretation of those rules.52 Under
the McDade Amendment, though, this question becomes complicated.53
Federal courts also regulate federal attorneys, including federal
prosecutors, through common law decision making.54 One way federal
courts do this is by “deciding issues in individual cases in a way that signals
the court’s view of appropriate conduct.”55 For example, if a federal judge
believes an attorney misbehaved in a particular case, he may “dismiss [the]
case, exclude evidence, instruct the jury in a way benefitting the defense, or
make other trial and pretrial rulings that respond to the prosecutorial
conduct.”56 Federal courts also issue ethics rules through common law
adjudication by punishing or criticizing individual attorneys.57 Judges both
criticize attorneys in written opinions and admonish them off the record.58
2. The Lead-Up to the McDade Amendment
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, a series of events brought the issue of
regulating federal prosecutors to the national stage. Two separate
controversies erupted, both over the ethical oversight of federal prosecutors.
First, the Department of Justice (DOJ) attempted to exempt itself from
certain ethics rules through internal memoranda and federal regulations.59
Second, Congressman Joseph McDade was criminally prosecuted on
allegations of bribery-related conduct,60 and he publically criticized the
ethical behavior of the federal prosecutors on his case.61 Both of these
controversies motivated Congress to enact the McDade Amendment.62 For
the purposes of this Note, only the DOJ’s attempts to exempt itself from
ethics regulations are particularly relevant.63
Starting in 1980, the DOJ and state ethics authorities began to express
disagreement regarding the “no-contact rule.”64 The no-contact rule is a
longstanding ethics regulation that prohibits attorneys from contacting

52. See supra text accompanying notes 38–51.
53. See infra Part II.
54. See McMorrow & Coquillette, supra note 35, § 801.02; see also Green & Zacharias,
supra note 30, at 401–05.
55. Green & Zacharias, supra note 30, at 401.
56. Id. at 401–02 nn.74–77 (citing examples of each).
57. See id. at 404.
58. See id. (citing examples).
59. See infra notes 64–90 and accompanying text.
60. See United States v. McDade, No. 92-249, 1992 WL 151314, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June
19, 1992) (federal grand jury indicting the congressman on five counts).
61. See Michael deCourcy Hinds, Top Republican on a House Panel Is Charged with
Accepting Bribes, N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 1992), http://www.nytimes.com/1992/05/06/us/toprepublican-on-a-house-panel-is-charged-with-accepting-bribes.html [http://perma.cc/X6EPVPQC].
62. See infra Part I.A.3.
63. The full history of Congressman McDade’s criminal prosecution, and his complaints
over the federal prosecutors who worked on it, are beyond the scope of this Note. For a
recounting of this history, see Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of
Federal Prosecutors, 88 GEO. L.J. 207, 211–12 (2000).
64. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2004).
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represented parties without their lawyers’ consent.65 In 1980, the DOJ
Office of Legal Counsel distributed a memorandum stating that federal
prosecutors did not violate the no-contact rule by contacting witnesses and
suspects, without their lawyers’ knowledge, before formal adversarial
proceedings began, if done in accordance with DOJ policy.66 In support of
its position, the DOJ pointed out that the no-contact rule permits contact
with represented parties if “authorized by law.”67 The DOJ claimed that it
had authority to adopt regulations that were a “reasonable and necessary
means to effectuate” the U.S. Attorney’s statutorily imposed duty68 to
“prosecute . . . all offenses against the United States.”69 According to the
DOJ, this was one such regulation and authorized the otherwise-prohibited
contacts.70
In 1988, in United States v. Hammad,71 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit questioned the legitimacy of the DOJ’s position. In
Hammad, the federal court adopted the no-contact rule through its local
rulemaking process.72 The defendant claimed that the DOJ violated the rule
when it directed an informant to contact him without his attorney’s
knowledge or consent.73 Although the Second Circuit admitted the
evidence obtained in this manner,74 the court held that the no-contact rule
was applicable to criminal investigations, including pre-indictment
contacts.75 The appellate court recognized that, in certain circumstances,
the use of an informant would be allowed under the “authorized by law”
exception.76 However, the court declined to explain the exact scenarios in
which the no-contact rule would allow these contacts.77 Therefore,
Hammad created uncertainty as to the rules applying to federal prosecutors
who engaged in undercover contacts of represented parties and as to the
consequences of violating these rules.
Attorney General Richard Thornburgh (“AG Thornburgh”) responded to
the uncertainty created by Hammad by circulating an internal memorandum

65. The current no-contact rule is Model Rule 4.2. See id. The predecessor rule was DR
7-102. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1969). This
Note refers to both as the “no-contact rule” and cites to the rule that was in effect at the time
of the source or history it is discussing.
66. See Ethical Restraints of the ABA Code of Prof’l Responsibility on Fed. Criminal
Investigations, 4B Op. O.L.C. 576, 576 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 DOJ Memo].
67. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-104.
68. 1980 DOJ Memo, supra note 66, at 582.
69. 28 U.S.C. § 547(1) (2012).
70. See 1980 DOJ Memo, supra note 66, at 576.
71. 858 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1988).
72. See id. at 837.
73. See id. at 836.
74. See id. at 842.
75. See id. at 838.
76. See id. (finding that there was “no principled basis in the rule to constrain its reach”
to post-indictment contacts).
77. See id. at 840 (“Notwithstanding requests for a bright-line rule, we decline to list all
possible situations that may violate [the no-contact rule].”).
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to all DOJ attorneys.78 The memo purported to exempt DOJ attorneys from
the no-contact rule, as well as from ethics rules limiting prosecutors’ ability
AG Thornburgh stressed that broad
to subpoena witnesses.79
interpretations of the no-contact rule would have a “substantial burden on
the law enforcement process” by restricting the government’s routine
contact with witnesses and use of undercover investigations.80 The memo
promised to challenge state disciplinary proceedings against federal
prosecutors who engaged in these contacts “on Supremacy Clause
grounds.”81
In 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno (“AG Reno”) promulgated formal
regulations (“the Reno Regulation”) continuing the exemption of federal
prosecutors from the no-contact rule.82 Through the Reno Regulation,
federal prosecutors were allowed to formally exempt themselves from state
ethics rules, creating a special and distinct set of rules applicable only to
them.83 The DOJ claimed that the Supremacy Clause sanctioned this
preemption of state ethics rules84 and invoked separation of powers to argue
that federal courts may not adopt or apply state rules to federal
prosecutors.85 However, AG Reno did state that the DOJ would voluntarily
comply with most professional rules.86
The DOJ’s actions drew much attention from the media and scholars
alike.87 Additionally, numerous lawsuits challenged the DOJ’s Supremacy
Clause and separation of powers arguments.88 Congress considered taking
action in 199089 but instead warned the DOJ of future congressional
oversight.90
78. See Memorandum from Att’y Gen. Richard L. Thornburgh to all Justice Dep’t
Litigators 1 (June 8, 1989), reprinted in In re Doe, 801 F. Supp. 478, 489 (D.N.M. 1992)
[hereinafter Thornburgh Memo].
79. See id. at 489, 493.
80. See id. at 489, 492.
81. Id. at 489, 493.
82. 28 C.F.R. § 77 (1994) [hereinafter Reno Regulation]. For an explanation of the
Reno Regulation, see Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,910
(1994).
83. See generally Reno Regulation, supra note 82.
84. See id. at 39,916.
85. See id. at 39,917.
86. See id. at 10,086 (“[F]ederal attorneys generally continue to be subject to state bar
ethical rules where they are licensed to practice, except in the limited circumstances where
state ethical rules clearly conflict with lawful federal procedures and practices.”).
87. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 63, at 213.
88. See, e.g., United States v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 132 F.3d 1252, 1257 (8th Cir.
1998) (rejecting the validity of the Reno Regulation); United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455,
1461 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting the claim that “general enabling statutes” legitimized the
DOJ’s definition of which contacts were “authorized by law”); see also Zacharias & Green,
supra note 63, at 213 (citing and describing cases challenging the DOJ’s separation of
powers arguments).
89. See H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, Fed. Prosecutorial Authority in a Changing
Legal Environment: More Attention Required, H.R. REP. NO. 101-986, at 32 (1990) (“We
disagree with the Attorney General’s attempts to exempt departmental attorneys from
compliance with the ethical requirements adopted by the State bars to which they belong and
in the rules of the Federal courts before which they appear.”).
90. See id. at 36.
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3. The McDade Amendment:
What It Is and How It Regulates Federal Prosecutors
In 1996, Congress took steps toward this threatened oversight.
Congressman McDade introduced a bill in the House of Representatives to
increase ethical regulation of federal prosecutors.91 This bill would
eventually become the McDade Amendment.92 Congressman McDade
introduced the legislation several times before Congress finally enacted it.93
Additionally, the Congressman introduced multiple versions of the bill,
with differing provisions regulating federal prosecutors, before Congress
enacted it in its current form.94 Eventually, in 2000, the bill was enacted as
the Act that regulates federal prosecutors today.95
The McDade Amendment provides, “An attorney for the Government
shall be subject to State laws and rules, and local Federal court rules,
governing attorneys in each State where such attorney engages in that
attorney’s duties, to the same extent and in the same manner as other
attorneys in that State.”96 In effect, the Act requires federal prosecutors to
“play by” the ethics rules of the state in which they practice.97 The Act also
requires federal prosecutors to abide by local federal court rules.98
The purpose of the McDade Amendment was to subject federal
prosecutors to heightened ethical regulation,99 motivated by the then-recent
controversies over the ethical behavior of federal prosecutors100 and
Congressman McDade’s personal experience with federal prosecutors.101
But in a larger sense, the Act was a response to the DOJ’s attempts to
exempt its attorneys from the no-contact rule.102 Witnesses who testified
on the bill before the House of Representatives made this clear.103 The Act
91. See H.R. 3386, 104th Cong. (1996).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2012).
93. The full history of the McDade Amendment’s enactment is beyond the scope of this
Note. For this history, see Green & Zacharias, supra note 63, at 214–15.
94. The substance of the proposed versions of the McDade Amendment are also beyond
the scope of this Note. For more information on these alternative versions of the Act, see id.
95. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B.
96. Id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 63, at 215 (stating that the Act was “intended to
regulate federal prosecutors more stringently and to limit their powers”); cf. 1996 Legislative
Hearings, supra note 18, at 10 (statement of Rep. Joseph McDade) (“The power of
prosecutors is tremendous and the problem of misconduct is serious.”).
100. See supra Part I.A.2.
101. See 1996 Legislative Hearings, supra note 18, at 7 (statement of Rep. Joseph
McDade) (referring to his “firsthand knowledge of the overzealousness and excessiveness of
[f]ederal prosecutors”). A detailed analysis of how Congressman McDade’s own criminal
prosecution influenced his legislation is beyond the scope of this Note. For more
information on this topic, see Green & Zacharias, supra note 63, at 214–15.
102. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 63, at 214 (explaining that witnesses who
testified on the bill in the House “focused on the Reno [Regulation] and its effect on state
ethics provisions forbidding contacts with represented persons . . . ”).
103. See 1996 Legislative Hearings, supra note 18, at 60 (statement of Tim Evans, Dir.,
Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers) (describing the bill as “a much needed, long overdue
measure to reign in professed self-policing prosecutors run amuck, and to end the reign of
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prohibits federal prosecutors from exempting themselves from ethics
rules,104 as the DOJ did with the no-contact rule.105 The Act rejects the
idea that federal prosecutors should be subject to a distinct and specialized
ethics regime.106 Rather, the Act requires that federal prosecutors abide by
the same ethics rules as all other attorneys in the state.107 In this way, the
idea that federal prosecutors are not unique and do not require specialized
ethical regulation is central to, and implicit in, the Act.108
Prior to the McDade Amendment, federal prosecutors were already
required to heed state ethics rules in two scenarios.109 First, federal
prosecutors were required to follow state ethics rules if the federal court had
adopted them into their local rules.110 Second, a state could hold a federal
prosecutor to its rules when that prosecutor performed work within the
state.111 The McDade Amendment did away with the need for a federal
court to adopt the state rules or for work to be performed in the state in
order for federal prosecutors to be bound by state rules.112 Instead, under
the McDade Amendment, all federal prosecutors are bound by the state
ethics rules of the jurisdiction where they practice.113 The framework for
regulating federal prosecutors that existed prior to the McDade
Amendment114 is still intact. For example, federal courts may still enact
their own rules governing federal attorneys115 and may still adopt the state’s
ethics rules.116 The McDade Amendment adds to this framework, rather
than replacing it.
The McDade Amendment’s directive that federal prosecutors follow state
ethics rules does nothing to change the fact that federal prosecutors are
bound by the rules of federal procedure and federal substantive law.117 The
prosecutorial imperialism begat by the roundly condemned ‘Thornburgh Memorandum’ of
June 1989”); id. at 96–97 (testimony of Roger Pilon, CATO Institute) (“[H]owever prudent
the [Reno Regulation] may or may not be, it is presumptuous at least for the department to
be telling the rest of us that it and it alone will set the rules for the conduct of its attorneys.”).
104. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2012).
105. See supra notes 64–86 and accompanying text (explaining the controversy over the
no-contact rule).
106. See supra note 103 (citing legislative history to this effect); see also supra notes 64–
86 and accompanying text (explaining the history of the DOJ’s treatment of the no-contact
rule that led Congress to enact the McDade Amendment).
107. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B.
108. See supra notes 64–107 and accompanying text.
109. See supra Part I.A.1.
110. See supra notes 39–44 and accompanying text.
111. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
112. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B.
113. See id.
114. See supra Part I.A.1.
115. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 39–44 and accompanying text.
117. See 28 C.F.R. § 77.1(b) (1999) (stating that the McDade Amendment “should not be
construed in any way to alter federal substantive, procedural, or evidentiary law”); 28 C.F.R.
§ 77.2(h)(1) (defining the phrase “state laws and rules and local federal court rules governing
attorneys” as it is used in the McDade Amendment as excluding “any statute, rule, or
regulation which does not govern ethical conduct, such as rules of procedure, evidence, or
substantive law”).
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Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution mandates this by dictating that
the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States “shall be the
supreme law of the land.”118 In practice, the Supremacy Clause invalidates
state laws that “interfere with, or are contrary to,” federal law.119 Because
federal rules of procedure and substance do not fall under the McDade
Amendment,120 federal prosecutors must follow these federal rules and not
state rules that interfere with them.121 Therefore, if a rule governs ethics, it
binds federal prosecutors under the McDade Amendment and the
Supremacy Clause is not implicated.122 However, if the rule is substantive
or procedural and inconsistent with a federal rule, the Supremacy Clause
mandates that federal prosecutors follow only the federal rule.123
Very few cases have interpreted the McDade Amendment.124 One
question that courts have addressed is whether federal prosecutors are
bound by every rule in a state’s ethics code, just by virtue of it being
labeled an “ethics rule.”125 Federal courts have said they are not.126 As
explained above, federal prosecutors are not bound by state procedural
rules.127 Federal courts have concluded that a rule may be procedural in
118. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
119. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 211 (1824).
120. See 28 C.F.R. § 77.1; 28 C.F.R. § 77.2(h)(1); see also sources cited supra note 117.
121. See United States v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d 136 (Ky. 2014).
122. See United States v. Colo. Supreme Court, 189 F.3d 1281, 1284 (10th Cir. 1999).
123. See id.
124. A total of thirty-six reported cases cite to the McDade Amendment. This includes
federal and state court cases at all levels, but cases that were appealed are only counted once.
See Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009); In re Auerhahn, 724 F.3d 103 (1st Cir.
2013); United States v. Lopez-Avila, 678 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Williams, 698 F.3d 374 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v. Carona, 660 F.3d 360 (9th Cir.
2011); United States v. Brown, 595 F.3d 498 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Olson, 450
F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2006); Augustine v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs, 429 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir.
2005); United States v. Whittaker, 268 F.3d 185 (3d Cir. 2001); United States v. Plumley,
207 F.3d 1086 (8th Cir. 2000); Stern v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Dist. Of Mass., 214 F.3d 4
(1st Cir. 2000); United States v. Talao, 222 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2000); Colo. Supreme Court,
189 F.3d 1281; United States v. Condon, 170 F.3d 687 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th
Cir. 1999); Cox v. United States, 105 Fed. Cl. 213 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2012); United States v.
Koerber, 966 F. Supp. 2d 1207 (D. Utah 2013); United States v. Binday, 908 F. Supp. 2d
485 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); In re Telfair, 745 F. Supp. 2d 536 (D.N.J. 2010); SEC v. Lines, 669 F.
Supp. 2d 460 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); United States v. Syling, 553 F. Supp. 2d 1187 (D. Haw.
2008); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 533 F. Supp. 2d 602 (W.D.N.C. 2007); In re Lucas, 317
B.R. 195 (D. Mass. 2004); United States v. Bowman, 277 F. Supp. 2d 1239 (N.D. Ala.
2003); In re Chan, 271 F. Supp. 2d 539 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); United States v. Dwyer, 287 F.
Supp. 2d 82 (D. Mass 2003); United States v. Grass, 239 F. Supp. 2d 535 (M.D. Pa. 2003);
N.Y. Bar Ass’n v. F.T.C., 276 F. Supp. 2d 110 (D.D.C. 2003); United States v. Reid, 214 F.
Supp. 2d 84 (D. Mass. 2002); United States v. Acosta, 111 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (E.D. Wis.
2000); Mendoza Toro v. Gil, 110 F. Supp. 2d 28 (D.P.R. 2000); United States v. Medina, 41
F. Supp. 2d 38 (D. Mass. 1999); United States v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d 136 (Ky.
2014); In re Crossen, 880 N.E.2d 352 (Mass. 2008); State ex rel. York v. W. Va. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 744 S.E.2d 293 (W. Va. 2013).
125. See, e.g., Colo. Supreme Court, 189 F.3d 1281; Stern, 214 F.3d 4.
126. See Stern, 214 F.3d at 20 (citing 28 C.F.R. § 77.2(h)(1), which states that the
applicability of the McDade Amendment does not depend on “whether or not [the state] rule
is included in a code of professional responsibility for attorneys”).
127. See supra notes 117–23 and accompanying text.
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nature even though it is adopted as an ethics rule and published in an ethics
code.128 For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
concluded that a rule limiting the ability of prosecutors to subpoena lawyers
for information on their clients, “though doubtless motivated by ethical
concerns, ha[d] outgrown those humble beginnings” and become, in
substance, a procedural rule.129 Federal courts are clear that rules such as
these—that appear to be ethics rules but are really procedural in nature—do
not apply to federal prosecutors under the McDade Amendment.130 These
decisions reflect an understanding that “[s]ubstance, not form, must
control.”131
However, courts have not addressed the issue of whether federal or state
court interpretations of ethics rules are definitive under the McDade
Amendment. Although no court has discussed this issue, both federal and
state courts interpret state ethics rules as they apply to federal prosecutors.
B. Judicial Interpretation of Ethics Rules Under the McDade Amendment
Despite the McDade Amendment’s clear directive that federal
prosecutors must abide by state court ethics rules,132 the Act says nothing
about whether federal or state courts’ interpretations of such rules are
definitive under the Act.133 Therefore, both state and federal courts
currently interpret state ethics rules as they apply to federal prosecutors.134
As a threshold matter, if a rule is not an ethics rule (for example, if it is a
procedural or substantive rule), federal courts have ultimate interpretive
authority.135 This section discusses judicial interpretation of state ethics
rules as they apply to federal prosecutors. Part I.B.1 begins by illustrating
that federal courts interpret these ethics rules. Part I.B.2 then shows that
state courts also interpret ethics rules as they apply to federal prosecutors.
1. Federal Courts Interpret State Ethics Rules
As They Apply to Federal Prosecutors
Federal courts frequently interpret state ethics rules as they apply to
federal prosecutors.136 The no-contact rule137 is one ethics provision that
128. See Stern, 214 F.3d at 20–21; Colo. Supreme Court, 189 F.3d at 1287–88
(developing a test to determine if a rule is procedural or ethical).
129. Stern, 214 F.3d at 20.
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2012); see also supra Part I.A.3 (explaining the Act).
133. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B; see also infra Part II.A (explaining that the plain text of the
Act does not state which courts’ interpretations are final).
134. See infra Part I.B.1–2.
135. See supra notes 117–23 and accompanying text.
136. See, e.g., United States v. Lowery, 166 F.3d 1119, 1121 (11th Cir. 1999)
(interpreting a Florida ethics rule stating lawyers shall not “fabricate evidence, counsel or
assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness”); United States v.
Syling, 553 F. Supp. 2d 1187, 1190–91 (D. Haw. 2008) (discussing whether federal
prosecutors have an ethical obligation to disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury); In
re Grand Jury Subpoena, 533 F. Supp. 2d 602, 607–10 (W.D.N.C. 2007) (interpreting a
North Carolina professional conduct rule providing circumstances where a prosecutor may
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federal courts have repeatedly interpreted.138 For example, in United States
v. Lopez,139 the U.S Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit interpreted
California’s version of the no-contact rule as it applied to a federal
prosecutor. Rule 2-100 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State
Bar of California, the state’s equivalent of the no-contact rule, prohibits a
member of the California State Bar from communicating with represented
parties without their counsel’s consent.140 In Lopez, the prosecutor, Lyons,
had met with a represented defendant to discuss the possibility of a plea
deal without the defendant’s lawyer present and without the lawyer’s
knowledge or consent.141 The Ninth Circuit concluded that Lyons breached
his ethical duties under Rule 2-100 by doing so.142
The Ninth Circuit had to interpret Rule 2-100 in order to determine if
Lyons breached it. For instance, the court interpreted the rule as imposing
an ethical obligation on a prosecutor “at the latest upon the moment of
indictment.”143 In addition, Rule 2-100 contains an exception for
“communications otherwise authorized by law.”144 The federal court
interpreted that exception as not applying to Lyons’s conduct.145 The Ninth
Circuit explained that federal statutes permitting prosecutors to
communicate with represented parties in order to detect and prosecute
federal offenses did not come under the “authorized by law” exception.146
Rather, the court interpreted the “authorized by law” exception to Rule 2100 as “requir[ing] that a statutory scheme expressly permit contact
between an attorney and a represented party.”147 The court stated that the
federal statutes the government pointed to as authorizing the
communication were “nothing more than general enabling statutes.”148

subpoena a lawyer in a grand jury proceeding to present evidence about a past or present
client); see also Federal Prosecutors, State Ethics Regulations, and the McDade
Amendment, Note, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2080, 2092–93 (2000) (noting that federal courts
interpret state ethics rules) [hereinafter Harvard Note].
137. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4.2 (1983); see also supra notes 64–90 and
accompanying text (discussing this rule and how it relates to the history of the McDade
Amendment).
138. See, e.g., United States v. Lemonakis, 485 F.2d 941, 955–56 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(interpreting the no-contact rule as not requiring a prosecutor to refrain from communication
with represented parties prior to their indictment); see also Grievance Comm. for the S. Dist.
of N.Y. v. Simels, 48 F.3d 640 (2d Cir. 1995) (interpreting the no-contact rule); United
States v. Lopez, 989 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1993) (same); In re Chan, 271 F. Supp. 2d 539
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (same); In re Searer, 950 F. Supp. 811 (W.D. Mich. 1996) (same).
139. 989 F.2d 1032 (9th Cir. 1993).
140. See CA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2-100(A) (“While representing a client, a
member shall not communicate directly or indirectly about the subject of the representation
with a party the member knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the
member has the consent of the other lawyer.”).
141. See Lopez, 989 F.2d at 1034–35.
142. See id. at 1041.
143. Id. at 1038.
144. CA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2-100(C)(3).
145. See Lopez, 989 F.2d at 1038–39.
146. See id.
147. Id. at 1039.
148. See id.
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Rule 2-100 is not unambiguous on its face. For instance, it only applies
where the lawyer “knows” the party is represented, the party must be
represented “in the matter” at issue, and there is an exception for conduct
that is “authorized by law.”149 These terms and others in the rule are vague,
such that that they require judicial interpretation in order to be applied.
Lopez illustrates that federal courts undertake this interpretation as it applies
to federal prosecutors.
2. State Courts Interpret State Ethics Rules
As They Apply to Federal Prosecutors
State courts also interpret state ethics rules as they apply to federal
prosecutors.150 As an example, consider the Kentucky Supreme Court’s
decision151 discussed above.152 Recall that the KBA held in an advisory
opinion that IAC waivers in plea agreements violate both defense attorneys’
and prosecutors’ ethical obligations under the state’s ethics rules.153 As
such, the KBA banned IAC waivers.154
As to the defense attorney, the KBA found that advising a client on
whether to sign an IAC waiver violates two provisions of the Kentucky
ethics rules.155 First, the rules state, “[A] lawyer shall not represent a client
if the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest”156 and define
a concurrent conflict of interest as creating “a significant risk that the
representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by . . . a
personal interest of the lawyer.”157 The KBA found such a conflict of
interest when a defense attorney advises a client on whether to sign an IAC
waiver.158 The KBA explained that a defense attorney is personally
interested in the client signing the IAC waiver because she has a personal
interest in preventing a court from finding that she was ineffective.159 In
addition, a successful IAC claim is a prerequisite to a malpractice suit in the
state of Kentucky.160 As such, the KBA concluded that defense counsel
149. CA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 2-100.
150. See, e.g., United States v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d 136 (Ky. 2014) (state supreme
court interpreting state ethics rule against waivers of ineffective assistance of counsel in plea
agreements as they apply to united states attorneys practicing in the jurisdiction); In re
Howes, 940 P.2d 159 (N.M. 1997) (interpreting the state’s no-contact rule as prohibiting an
investigator from speaking with a defendant without his lawyer’s consent where the
defendant initiated the communication); In re Gatti, 8 P.3d 966, 974–76 (Or. 2000) (state
court interpreting state ethics rule to forbid all lawyers, including federal prosecutors, from
using deceit in investigations).
151. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d 136.
152. See supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text.
153. See Ky. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. E-435 (2012); see also supra notes 1–2 and
accompanying text.
154. See Ky. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. E-435; see also supra notes 1–2 and accompanying
text.
155. See Ky. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. E-435 at 2.
156. KY. ST. S. CT. R. 3.130(1.7)(a).
157. Id. 3.130(1.7)(a)(2).
158. See Ky. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. E-435 at 2.
159. See id.
160. See id.

2015] JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF STATE ETHICS RULES

217

advising on an IAC waiver violates the state’s rule161 prohibiting
agreements that prospectively limit a lawyer’s liability to a client for
malpractice.162
The KBA also found that prosecutors violate the Kentucky ethics rules
by including IAC waivers in plea agreements.163 The state ethics rules
prohibit an attorney from inducing or assisting another to breach the
rules.164 As explained above, the KBA concluded that a defense attorney
breaches her ethical duties by advising on an IAC waiver.165 Therefore, the
KBA found, by including or requiring such a waiver, the prosecutor induces
or assists the defense attorney to violate the ethics rules.166 In addition,
comments to the Kentucky ethics rules state that “[a] prosecutor has the
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.”167
The KBA concluded that a prosecutor breaches his duty to act as a
“minister of justice” when he includes an IAC waiver in a plea
agreement.168 Because the KBA concluded that IAC waivers violate the
Kentucky ethics rules, it prohibited all prosecutors practicing in the state,
including federal prosecutors, from requesting or requiring them as part of a
plea agreement.169
The United States Attorney’s Offices for the Eastern and Western
Districts of Kentucky (“the USAO”) asked the Kentucky Supreme Court to
review the ethics opinion.170 The USAO argued that it was not bound by
the KBA’s opinion under the McDade Amendment.171 The Kentucky
Supreme Court disagreed with the USAO and found instead that federal
prosecutors must comply with the KBA’s opinion.172
In reaching this conclusion, the state supreme court interpreted the state
ethics rules as they applied to federal prosecutors.173 Specifically, it
interpreted the state’s conflict of interest rule as prohibiting defense
attorneys from advising on IAC waivers.174 The state supreme court also
interpreted the state’s rule against limiting malpractice liability as
prohibiting defense counsel from discussing an IAC waiver with her
client.175 Further, the Kentucky Supreme Court interpreted the state’s rule
prohibiting lawyers from inducing or assisting others to violate the ethics
161. KY. ST. S. CT. R. 3.130(1.8)(h).
162. See Ky. Bar Ass’n, Ethics Op. E-435 at 2.
163. See id. at 3.
164. See KY. ST. S. CT. R. 3.130(8.4)(a).
165. See supra notes 155–62 and accompanying text.
166. See Ky. Bar Ass’n Ethics Op. E-435 at 3.
167. KY. ST. S. CT. R. 3.130(3.8), cmt. 1.
168. See Ky. Bar Ass’n Ethics Op. E-435 at 3.
169. See id. at 1.
170. See Brief for Respondent, United States v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d 136 (Ky.
2014) (No. 2013-SC-000270), 2013 WL 8610407, at *2 (stating that the USAO sought
review of the KBA’s opinion and asked that the Kentucky Supreme Court vacate it).
171. See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 3, at *1–2.
172. See Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d 136.
173. See id.
174. See id. at 151–55.
175. See id. at 155–56.
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rules as disallowing prosecutors from requesting IAC waivers.176 Finally, it
read Kentucky’s rule stating that prosecutors are “minister[s] of justice” to
preclude prosecutors from including IAC waivers in plea agreements.177
It is clear that state ethics rules contain ambiguities178 and require
judicial interpretation in order to be applied.179 In United States v.
Kentucky. Bar Ass’n,180 the state supreme court provided this
interpretation.181 Nowhere do the Kentucky ethics rules explicitly prohibit
IAC waivers.182 Rather, the state supreme court interpreted ambiguous
ethics rules as prohibiting this specific attorney conduct.183 In short, the
Kentucky Supreme Court interpreted the state’s ethics rules, as the KBA
had, as prohibiting IAC waivers.184
In September 2014, the DOJ effectively mooted the issue of attorney
ethical obligations surrounding IAC waivers in plea agreements. Then-AG
Holder announced that federal prosecutors would no longer seek IAC
waivers in plea agreements.185 Going forward, federal prosecutors will not
seek IAC waivers because of internal DOJ policy.186 Prior to this, though,
federal prosecutors in Kentucky could not have sought IAC waivers under
the Kentucky Supreme Court’s interpretation of the state ethics rules.187
II. THE ULTIMATE AUTHORITY TO INTERPRET STATE ETHICS RULES AS
THEY APPLY TO FEDERAL PROSECUTORS: ARE FEDERAL COURTS’ OR
STATE COURTS’ INTERPRETATIONS DEFINITIVE?
As the proceeding sections show, both federal and state courts interpret
state ethics rules as they apply to federal prosecutors.188 If state courts are
the definitive source of interpretation of ethics rules as they apply to federal
prosecutors, then federal prosecutors must abide by the state rules as
interpreted by state courts. If federal courts’ interpretations are definitive,
then federal prosecutors must abide by the state rules, as interpreted by
federal courts. However, as it currently stands, with both court systems
interpreting the rules and no authority on which is definitive, federal
prosecutors must abide by both state court and federal court interpretations
of state ethics rules.

176. See id. at 157.
177. See id.
178. See, e.g., KY. ST. S. CT. R. 3.130(8.4(a)) (“It is professional misconduct for a lawyer
to: . . . knowingly assist or induce another [attorney] to . . . violate or attempt to violate the
Rules of Professional Conduct . . . .” (emphasis added)).
179. See, e.g., Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d at 157 (interpreting the words “knowingly” and
“induce” in the ethics rules).
180. 439 S.W.3d 136 (Ky. 2014).
181. See id. at 151–57.
182. See KY. ST. S. CT. R. 1–9.
183. See Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d at 151–57.
184. See id. at 157–58.
185. See Palazzolo, supra note 12.
186. See id.
187. See Ky. Bar Ass’n, 439 S.W.3d at 157–58.
188. See supra Part I.B.1–2.
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This is a recipe for insanity for at least two reasons. First, the need to
abide by two courts’ interpretations of ethics rules is likely to chill federal
prosecutors in performing their official duties. With both federal and state
courts interpreting ethics rules, federal prosecutors are bound to be
uncertain of which courts’ interpretations apply to them.189 Uncertainty
over their ethical obligations is likely to hinder federal prosecutors’ ability
to effectively perform their jobs because they may not take action for fear
of being sanctioned.190
Second, the conflict over interpretation is most pronounced where a
federal and a state court in the same jurisdiction disagree over the
interpretation of the same ethics rule. For example, consider a hypothetical.
Imagine that a federal district court in Kentucky has reached the opposite
conclusion from the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision discussed above
concerning IAC waivers191: the state court has interpreted the state ethics
rules as prohibiting IAC waivers,192 but the federal court has interpreted the
same rules as allowing them. In this way, imagine that the state supreme
court and the district court in the same jurisdiction have reached opposing
interpretations of the same state ethics rules. Federal prosecutors cannot
comply with both interpretations—one allows them to include IAC waivers
in plea agreements but the other prohibits them from doing so. Which
court’s interpretation prevails in this situation?
The answer depends on the McDade Amendment.193 If being “subject to
State laws and rules . . . governing attorneys in each State where such
attorney engages in that attorney’s duties”194 includes state courts’
interpretation of those rules, then the state court’s interpretation reigns. If,
however, this language does not include state courts’ interpretations of
ethics rules, but only the rules themselves, then federal courts are the
definitive source for interpreting the state rules as they apply to federal
prosecutors.195 No court has addressed this question. Although it was
189. Cf. infra note 224 and accompanying text (explaining that federal prosecutors were
confused as to which interpretations of the ethics rules applied to them before the McDade
Amendment was enacted and that the Act was meant to remedy this confusion).
190. Cf. infra notes 223–27 and accompanying text (describing that this was the case
before the McDade Amendment was adopted and that the legislation was enacted in part to
address this issue); cf. Harvard Note, supra note 136, at 2093 (explaining the same
phenomenon where prosecutors are unsure of whether a federal or state ethics rule applies).
191. See supra notes 172–84 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 172–84 and accompanying text.
193. 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2012).
194. Id.
195. Of note, however, is that, in the case of Kentucky, a clever district court could have
dodged the issue of whether federal or state courts’ interpretations of state ethics rules are
definitive. A federal judge could have found that she must defer to state court interpretations
of ethics rules as they apply to federal prosecutors under the McDade Amendment but noted
that she is not required to defer to state court interpretations of the rules as they apply to
federal defenders because the Act only pertains to federal prosecutors. The judge would
then not be required to defer to the state court’s finding that IAC waivers breach defense
attorneys’ ethical obligations. If the defense attorney breached no ethical duty, the
prosecutor would not have breached his duty not to induce or assist others in violating the
ethics rules. If the court so found, the state court’s prohibition of IAC waivers would not
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raised when the McDade Amendment was enacted,196 this issue was not
solved in the legislative history or text of the Act.197 The scholarship
addresses this question only in passing.198
This section explores the question of which court system’s interpretation
is definitive, presenting the arguments in favor of both federal and state
court interpretation. First, Part II.A discusses how the plain text of the
McDade Amendment does not address the question of judicial
interpretation in any meaningful way. Second, Part II.B illustrates how the
legislative history also fails to resolve this issue. Finally, Part II.C lays out
the policies and purposes of the McDade Amendment and discusses how
they may help to answer the question of judicial interpretation.
A. The Plain Text of the McDade Amendment
The McDade Amendment reads:
(a) An attorney for the Government shall be subject to State laws and
rules, and local Federal court rules, governing attorneys in each State
where such attorney engages in that attorney’s duties, to the same extent
and in the same manner as other attorneys in that State. (b) The Attorney
General shall make and amend rules of the Department of Justice to
assure compliance with this section.199

As seen in the text, the Act does not explicitly answer the question of
interpretation.200 The Act does not say whether federal or state courts are
definitive for purposes of interpretation of the ethics rules.201 In fact, the

apply to federal prosecutors even if the federal court deferred to the state court generally on
matters of ethics interpretation.
196. See supra notes 17–21 and accompanying text.
197. See supra Part II.A–B.
198. There has been very little scholarly discussion on this subject and virtually no indepth treatment. A handful of scholars have assumed, without discussion, that state courts
have the ultimate authority to interpret state ethics rules. However, these scholars mention
this assumption in passing, do not explore the issue in any detail, and do not offer a reason
for their assumption. See J. Nick Badgerow, Honor in Battle: The Conflict Between Candor
and Zealous Advocacy, 70-OCT J. KAN. B.A. 16, 21 (2001) (“Thus, under the McDade
Amendment, all government lawyers must comply with the rules of ethics applicable in the
state(s) where they practice. This would include the state’s interpretation and application of
the no-contact provisions of Rule 4.2.” (emphasis added)); Megan Browdie & Wei Xiang,
Note, Chevron Protects Citizens: Reviving the Citizens Protection Act, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 695, 696 (2009) (“[A] proper construction of the [McDade Amendment] requires
district courts to rely on state interpretations and remedies when applying that state’s ethics
rules to federal prosecutors.” (emphasis added)); Rima Sirota, Reassessing the Citizens
Protection Act: A Good Thing It Passed, and a Good Thing It Failed, 43 SW. L. REV. 51,
75–76 (2013) (“Both [McDade Amendment] supporters and opponents expected that the
new law would subject federal prosecutors to state interpretations of the no-contact rule—
just like ‘other attorneys in that State’—and that state law would narrow or eliminate the
availability of the pre-charge investigatory exemption.” (emphasis added)).
199. 28 U.S.C. § 530B.
200. See id.
201. See id.
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Act makes no clear mention of judicial interpretation whatsoever.202
Further, the plain text can be read in at least two different ways.203
On the one hand, the McDade Amendment can be read as favoring state
court interpretation. The Act requires federal prosecutors to comply with
the state ethics rules “to the same extent and in the same manner as other
attorneys in that State.”204 Other attorneys in the state205 are required to
abide by the state court’s interpretations of the rules. Therefore, the
language requiring federal prosecutors to follow the state ethics rules “to
the same extent as . . . other attorneys in that State”206 may include a
requirement that federal prosecutors abide by state court interpretations.
Under this reading of the Act, the text implicitly renders state courts
definitive for purposes of interpreting state ethics rules as they apply to
federal prosecutors.
On the other hand, an argument may be made that the Act is silent as to
judicial interpretation. The portion of the text stating that federal
prosecutors are subject “to the same extent and in the same manner as other
attorneys in that State”207 can be read to attach only to the earlier portion of
the text requiring federal prosecutors to abide by “State . . . rules.”208
Under this reading, the text may be said to require only that federal
prosecutors follow the rules to the same extent as other attorneys in the
state, but to be silent as to interpretation.
The plain text of the McDade Amendment does little to answer the
question of whether federal or state courts are the ultimate source of
interpretation under the Act. The Act does not explicitly address this
issue.209 Moreover, that the text can be read in multiple ways210 suggests
that it is not a meaningful source to answer the question of interpretive
authority.
B. The McDade Amendment’s Legislative History
Moving beyond the plain text, the McDade Amendment’s legislative
history also does not answer whether Congress intended federal or state
courts to be the definitive source of ethics rule interpretation. The
legislative history shows that the issue was raised in Congress in the debate
over whether to enact the McDade Amendment.211 Despite this, the issue
was not resolved, either by members of Congress while debating the Act212

202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

See id.
See infra notes 204–08 and accompanying text.
28 U.S.C. § 530B(a).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
See id.
See supra notes 204–08 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 215–34 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 215–34 and accompanying text.
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or in the Act itself.213 In fact, those testifying before Congress explicitly
remarked that the McDade Amendment left the issue of judicial
interpretation open and unsolved.214
There are multiple references to interpretation of ethics rules generally in
the McDade Amendment’s legislative history.215
For example, in
explaining why the DOJ adopted the Reno Regulation,216 a spokesman for
the Department explained that broad judicial interpretations of the nocontact rule interfered with law enforcement’s ability to carry out its official
duties.217 On the other side of the debate, proponents of the Act argued that
it was necessary because the DOJ had interpreted the no-contact rule itself
so as not to apply to federal prosecutors and the DOJ should not have this
authority.218 These proponents of the Act explained that allowing those
who are governed by a rule to interpret it “renders the rule meaningless”
and that the manner in which the DOJ had interpreted the rule “displays an
arrogant disregard for . . . ethics in the legal profession.”219
Beyond debate about interpretation of ethics rules generally, the
legislative history also includes discussion over the inherent problems with
conflicting state and federal court interpretations of ethics rules.220 Those
opposed to the Act explained that the DOJ’s concern over differing
interpretations of ethics rules by federal and state courts221 motivated it to
promulgate the Reno Regulation.222 For instance, Seth P. Waxman, thenAssociate Deputy Attorney General, testified before the House that, prior to
the McDade Amendment’s enactment, federal and state courts interpreted
no-contact rules differently.223 Waxman stated that prosecutors were left
uncertain as to which courts’ interpretation would be enforced against
213. See supra Part II.A (explaining that the plain text of the McDade Amendment does
not address this issue).
214. See infra note 233 and accompanying text.
215. See generally 1996 Legislative Hearings, supra note 18.
216. 28 C.F.R. § 77 (1994). For an explanation of the Reno Regulation, see supra notes
82–86.
217. See 1996 Legislative Hearings, supra note 18, at 13 (statement of Seth P. Waxman,
Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice) (“[T]he expansive application of the contacts
rule in some jurisdictions has threatened legitimate and essential law enforcement
activities.”); accord Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,911 (Aug.
4, 1994) (explaining that broad interpretations of the no-contact rule in some states chilled
prosecutors in the exercise of their duties).
218. See 1996 Legislative Hearings, supra note 18, at 62 (statement of Tim Evans, Dir.,
Nat’l Ass’n of Criminal Def. Lawyers).
219. Id. (quoting U.S. Dist. J. Juan Burciaga).
220. See 1996 Legislative Hearings, supra note 18, at 14 (statement of Seth P. Waxman,
Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice).
221. See id.
222. 28 C.F.R. § 77 (1994).
223. See 1996 Legislative Hearings, supra note 18, at 14 (statement of Seth P. Waxman,
Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice) (“Federal prosecutors are facing conflicting
interpretations of contacts regulations by various State and Federal authorities. For example,
while the Federal courts have almost uniformly held that the contacts rules have no
application to pre-indictment noncustodial communications, some State courts have reached
the opposite conclusion.”); accord Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg.
39,911 (Aug. 4, 1994) (explaining that “state courts and state bar organizations have varied
widely in their interpretation of the scope” of the no-contact rules).
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them.224 This uncertainty, Waxman claimed, chilled prosecutors in the
execution of their official duties.225 Waxman explained that the DOJ issued
the Reno Regulation226 to free federal prosecutors from confusion over
whether to follow federal or state court interpretations of the no-contact
rule.227
These statements make clear that interpretation of ethics rules was raised
as a potential issue before Congress while debating the McDade
Amendment.228 Further, they show that the issues surrounding conflicting
federal and state court interpretations of state ethics rules were raised during
the debate.229 Judicial interpretation of ethics rules was a part of the
conversation over the McDade Amendment.230 Despite this, the issue of
whether federal or state court interpretation would be definitive under the
Act was not resolved in these debates.231
Moreover, those testifying before Congress explicitly stated that the
McDade Amendment left the issue of judicial interpretation unresolved.
The DOJ complained that, under the Act, federal and state courts would
both interpret ethics rules as they applied to federal prosecutors.232 Even
more explicit is Waxman’s statement:
[T]he bill leaves open, and confused, the question of
enforcement . . . . Whose interpretation of the bar rules will count for
purposes of enforcement? These are not easy questions. I raise them not

224. See 1996 Legislative Hearings, supra note 18, at 14 (statement of Seth P. Waxman,
Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice) (referring to “[t]he uncertainty resulting from
these and other conflicting decisions”).
225. See id. (“The uncertainty resulting from these and other conflicting decisions hinder
the ability of prosecutors to conduct law enforcement investigations. Our attorneys were
hesitant to authorize undercover contacts without reassurance that they would not be
subjected to unwarranted disciplinary action by bar authorities applying vague and broad
rules in widely varying manners.”); accord Communications with Represented Persons, 59
Fed. Reg. 39,911 (explaining that uncertainty over which state’s interpretation of ethics rules
governs has chilled prosecutorial performance).
226. 28 C.F.R. § 77.
227. 1996 Legislative Hearings, supra note 18, at 14 (statement of Seth P. Waxman,
Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice) (“Under this regime, the Attorney General was
left with the unpalatable choice of reducing reliance on such essential law enforcement
techniques or returning complete control of law enforcement investigations to investigators,
who are not subject to an attorney’s ethical constraints and who also typically lack an
attorney’s legal training and appreciation of the fine points of the legal constraints on
investigative activity. Instead, the Attorney General promulgated the contacts regulation.”);
accord Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,927 (stating that the
DOJ policy is necessary to protect against variation in “state and local rules and in
interpretations of those rules” (emphasis added)); id. at 39,928–29 (stating that the purpose
of the Reno Regulation is “eliminating the uncertainty and confusion arising from the variety
of interpretations given to that rule and analogous rules by state and federal courts”).
228. See supra notes 215–27 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 220–27 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 220–27 and accompanying text.
231. See generally 1996 Legislative Hearings, supra note 18.
232. See Communications with Represented Persons, 59 Fed. Reg. 39,927 (stating that,
under the Act, it would be “left to the various state and federal district courts to interpret
[ethics] rules and determine on their own whether they had been violated in any particular
case”).

224

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

because I have the answers, but because the answers are necessary to any
consideration of this bill.233

There was no further discussion on this point.234 Therefore, while the
legislative history shows that those testifying on the Act raised the issue of
judicial interpretation, it does not indicate any congressional intent as to
which court system has ultimate interpretive authority under the Act.235
C. The Purposes and Policies of the McDade Amendment
Unlike the plain text and legislative history of the McDade Amendment,
which do little to answer the question over judicial interpretation of state
ethics rules,236 the underlying purposes and policies of the Act provide
guidance on this issue. This section describes the arguments in favor of
both federal and state court interpretation based on the purposes and
policies of the Act. Part II.C.1 explains how the primary purposes of the
McDade Amendment suggest that state courts’ interpretations of ethics
rules should be definitive as they apply to federal prosecutors. Part II.C.2
describes how federal prosecutors are unique as compared to state
prosecutors and why this supports federal court interpretation. Finally, Part
II.C.3 lays out why state courts’ expertise in ethics regulation weighs in
favor of state court interpretation.
1. The Underlying Purposes of the McDade Amendment
Support State Court Interpretation
The primary function of the McDade Amendment is to make federal
prosecutors subject to state ethics rules.237 Rules, however, mean little in
our common law system standing alone.238 Rather, rules get their meaning
from judicial interpretation.239 One may argue that making federal
prosecutors subject to state ethics rules, but not states’ interpretations of
those rules, ignores the centrality of judicial interpretation to the meaning of
rules in our common law system.
Further, under the McDade Amendment, federal courts may not trump
state ethics rules with their own ethics regulations for federal
prosecutors;240 rather, the state rules govern.241 If federal courts have
definitive interpretive authority, they may adopt ethics rules for federal
233. 1996 Legislative Hearings, supra note 18, at 47 (statement of Seth P. Waxman,
Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice).
234. See generally id.
235. See supra notes 215–34 and accompanying text.
236. See supra Part II.A–B (discussing the Act’s plain text and legislative history,
respectively).
237. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2012); see also supra Part I.A.3 (explaining the Act).
238. See Barbara K. Bucholtz, Rules, Principles, or Just Words? The Interpretive Project
and the Problem of Legitimacy, 11 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 377, 379 n.5 (2005) (“[A]ll law,
whether codified or customary requires interpretation or elaboration in particular court
cases.”).
239. See id.
240. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B.
241. See id.
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prosecutors through their opinions.242 This would effectively allow federal
courts to supersede state ethics rules with their own rules for federal
prosecutors.243 One may argue that allowing federal courts to essentially
create rules through interpretation contradicts the McDade Amendment’s
prohibition on federal courts trumping state courts’ ethics rules for federal
prosecutors.244
Moreover, allowing federal courts to definitively interpret the rules may
be inconsistent with the McDade Amendment’s attempt to make federal
prosecutors subject to the same ethics regulations as all attorneys.245
Congress enacted the McDade Amendment in response to the Reno
Regulation,246 under which federal prosecutors had exempted themselves
from certain ethics rules and created a specialized set of regulations
applicable only to them.247 Through the McDade Amendment, Congress
prohibited this behavior.248 Congress bound federal prosecutors to the
same ethics rules as all other attorneys.249 In so doing, Congress rejected
the idea that federal prosecutors require a special set of ethics rules.250
Federal courts’ interpretations of state ethics rules are generally not
definitive.251 One may argue that if federal courts are allowed to
definitively interpret state ethics rules as they apply to federal prosecutors—
where they do not definitively interpret state ethics rules as they apply to
other attorneys—federal prosecutors are not truly subject to the same ethics
rules as all other attorneys. Rather, under such a framework, federal
prosecutors alone are bound by federal court interpretations of the ethics
rules. Therefore, regarding federal courts’ interpretations as definitive may
be contrary to the function and purposes of the Act.252
2. The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors
Supports Federal Court Interpretation
Even though the McDade Amendment rejected the idea that federal
prosecutors require a distinct set of ethics regulations,253 there is a strong
242. Cf. supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text (explaining that federal courts regulate
attorney ethics through common law decision making).
243. Cf. supra notes 54–58 and accompanying text.
244. See supra Part I.A.3 (explaining that the McDade Amendment seeks to apply state
ethics rules to federal prosecutors).
245. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B; see also supra Part I.A.3. (describing the McDade
Amendment).
246. 28 C.F.R. § 77 (1994). For an explanation of the Reno Regulation, see supra notes
82–86 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 64–90 and accompanying text.
248. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 530B (requiring federal prosecutors to abide by all state ethics rules
in the jurisdiction where they practice); see also supra Part I.A.3. (explaining the McDade
Amendment).
249. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 530B.
250. See supra notes 102–08 and accompanying text.
251. See supra Part I.B.2 (explaining that state courts interpret state ethics rules on their
own).
252. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 530B; see also supra Part I.A.3. (describing the McDade
Amendment).
253. See supra notes 102–08 and accompanying text.
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argument that federal prosecutors are, in fact, unique.254 One may argue
that allowing federal courts to definitively interpret state ethics rules
accounts for this uniqueness while still complying with the McDade
Amendment.255 This argument posits that federal prosecutors are unique
from state prosecutors in multiple ways,256 federal litigation is distinct from
state litigation,257 and federal substantive law differs from state substantive
law.258 As a result, ethics rules apply differently to federal prosecutors than
to state prosecutors259 and operate differently in federal court than in state
court.260 To account for these differences, this argument suggests, ethics
rules should be tailored to federal prosecutors and federal court.261
However, this argument acknowledges that the McDade Amendment was
enacted in part as a response to the Reno Regulation262 and that federal
prosecutors should not be able to exempt themselves from ethics rules as
they did in that instance.263 Therefore, this argument concludes that federal
courts should tailor ethics rules through interpretation of state rules, and the
McDade Amendment allows for this.264
Federal prosecutors are unique from state prosecutors in at least three
ways.265 First, as Senator Orrin Hatch emphasized when opposing the
McDade Amendment, there are differences between the job of a federal and
a state prosecutor.266 Senator Hatch explained that federal prosecutors
more often work on cases involving “complex, ongoing, conspiratorial
conduct,”267 for instance, cases of “multistate terrorism, drug, fraud or
organized crime conspiracies . . . fraud against federally funded
programs . . . [violations of] civil rights laws . . . complex corporate crime,
and . . . environmental crime.”268 Second, scholars have noted “[a] related
distinction involv[ing] the context and mechanics of federal
prosecutions.”269 These scholars point out that federal prosecutors more
often work across state lines, are more often personally involved in preindictment investigations, and more often use grand juries than state
254. See infra notes 265–80 and accompanying text.
255. See infra notes 300–04 and accompanying text.
256. See infra notes 265–80 and accompanying text.
257. See infra notes 282–88 and accompanying text.
258. See infra notes 289–91 and accompanying text.
259. See infra notes 276–81 and accompanying text.
260. See infra notes 283–88, 291 and accompanying text.
261. See infra notes 292–99 and accompanying text.
262. 28 C.F.R. § 77 (1994); see supra notes 64–90 and accompanying text (explaining the
Reno Regulation and its history); supra notes 102–08 (describing how the McDade
Amendment responded to the Reno Regulation).
263. See infra notes 300–04 and accompanying text.
264. See infra notes 300–04 and accompanying text.
265. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 63, at 235–42 (summarizing the many arguments
for why federal prosecutors are different from state prosecutors).
266. See S. 250, 106th Cong. (1999); see also Green & Zacharias, supra note 63, at 237
(“Hatch relied upon a perceived distinction between the nature of the conduct that state and
federal criminal laws cover.”).
267. Green & Zacharias, supra note 63, at 237.
268. The Effect of State Ethics Rules: Hearing on S. 250 Before the Subcomm. on
Criminal Justice Oversight, 106th Cong. (1999) (Statement of Sen. Hatch).
269. See, e.g., Green & Zacharias, supra note 63, at 237.
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prosecutors.270 Finally, there are differences in the executive offices that
govern federal and state prosecutors.271 Most states have multiple
prosecutorial bodies, for instance statewide and local units, and these make
up a fragmented collection of prosecutorial offices.272 Additionally, the
State Attorney General’s Office usually oversees only portions of the state’s
prosecutions.273 Therefore, no one state prosecutor’s office may speak on
behalf of all state prosecutors.274 In comparison, the DOJ “represents the
law enforcement authority for the entire federal executive branch” and “[i]ts
positions are authoritative.”275
Some argue that these distinctive qualities mean that ethics rules should
apply differently to federal prosecutors than they do to state prosecutors.276
For example, federal prosecutors themselves point to three ethics rules that
hamper their ability to perform their official duties.277 First, according to
the DOJ, the no-contact rule hinders federal prosecutors’ ability to carry out
undercover investigations.278 Second, the DOJ argues that rules limiting
attorney subpoenas obstruct the government’s effective use of grand
juries.279 Third, the DOJ maintains that interpretations of ethics rules
requiring prosecutors to share exculpatory evidence with grand juries
interfere with the unique federal interests in grand jury proceedings.280 In
each of these cases, the DOJ contends that the distinctive qualities of
federal prosecutors mean that ethics rules apply more onerously to federal
government attorneys than to state prosecutors. Despite this, no state’s
ethics rules distinguish between federal and state prosecutors or provide
different rules for the two groups.281
In addition to federal prosecutors being unique as compared to state
prosecutors, federal litigation is different from state litigation in important
ways.282 Some of these differences are relevant to the regulation of
prosecutors.283 For instance, in some states, counsel may accompany a
witness in grand jury proceedings and provide advice throughout.284
270. See id.
271. See id. at 241.
272. See id.
273. See id.
274. See id.
275. Id.
276. See, e.g., id. at 238 (explaining that the uniqueness of federal prosecutors means that
“a restriction may be reasonable for the state’s prosecutors, while being inappropriate for
federal prosecutors”); Green & Zacharias, supra note 30, at 426–31 (arguing that ethics rules
apply differently to federal prosecutors in some situations); cf. Harvard Note, supra note
136, at 2083 (“Many ethics rules hold implications for federal prosecutors that are not raised
by their application to attorneys more generally.”).
277. See Harvard Note, supra note 136, at 2083–84.
278. See id. at 2084.
279. See id.
280. See id.
281. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 30, at 394.
282. See id. at 428–29.
283. See id.
284. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
486–87 (3d ed. 2000); see also Kathryn E. White, Note, What Have You Done with My
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Federal grand jury proceedings do not provide for this.285 The absence of
this protection in federal court may justify additional ethical obligations for
federal prosecutors—for example, a duty to advise the witness of the right
against self-incrimination or to take care not to mislead the witness.286
Additionally, federal court itself differs from state court, and these
differences may affect ethics regulation.287 For example, differences in the
courts’ workloads may affect how much time judges have to address ethics
issues and how great of an interest courts have in easily applied,
predetermined ethics rules.288
Finally, federal substantive law differs from state substantive law.
Substantive law and ethics regulations often interplay.289 Federal courts are
arguably more expert on federal law than state courts.290 Moreover, state
courts may not consider the implications ethics regulations have on federal
substantive law.291
The distinctiveness of federal prosecutors, federal courts, and federal law,
and the differences in how ethics rules apply in these situations, has led
some to argue that federal prosecutors should be regulated differently than
other attorneys. Importantly, some have advocated for different ethics rules
for federal prosecutors because they are unique and because ethics rules
apply differently to them.292 This was one of the DOJ’s reasons for the
Reno Regulation that led to the McDade Amendment in the first place.293
Similarly, arguments for distinct ethics regulations for federal prosecutors
drove the opposition to the McDade Amendment in Congress.294
Arguments that federal prosecutors should have special ethical obligations
did not end when the McDade Amendment was enacted, though. Rather,
scholarly conversation continues over whether the uniqueness of federal
prosecutors warrants a distinct set of ethics regulations for this group.295
Lawyer?: The Grand Jury Witness’s Right to Consult with Counsel, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
907, 935–36 (1999).
285. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 30, at 429.
286. See id.
287. See id.
288. See id.
289. See id. at 430.
290. See id.
291. See id.
292. See infra notes 293–95 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 64–90 and accompanying text (explaining the Reno Regulation and
how it led Congress to enact the McDade Amendment).
294. See supra notes 103–09, 217, 250 and accompanying text (explaining that the DOJ
opposed the McDade Amendment because of a belief that federal prosecutors required
specialized ethics rules).
295. See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, State Ethical Codes and Federal Practice: Emerging
Conflicts and Suggestions for Reform, 19 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 969, 974 (1992) (advocating
for the creation of a federal ethics regime); Green & Zacharias, supra note 63, at 237
(exploring whether distinctions between federal and state prosecutors justify separate ethics
regulations and stating “[t]o the extent federal cases truly tend to be more complex than state
cases, there thus may be grounds for applying different ethical standards to the prosecutors
involved”); Harvard Note, supra note 136, at 2081, 2095–97 (arguing that “Congress and the
federal courts must remain involved in crafting reasoned exceptions to state ethics rules for
federal prosecutors”); Gregory B. LeDonne, Note, Revisiting the McDade Amendment:
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Some scholars have also argued that the differences between federal and
state court prosecutors, litigation, and substantive law mean that federal
courts should regulate federal prosecutors.296 First, the uniqueness of
federal prosecutors has led some scholars to argue that federal courts are
better situated to regulate this group.297 Additionally, some scholars have
argued that federal courts are better suited to regulate federal prosecutors in
areas where federal litigation is distinctive because federal courts
understand federal litigation better than state courts.298 Finally, some
scholars argue that “[w]hen federal constitutional law or substantive federal
law is important to the question of how federal prosecutors should be
regulated, federal courts should be free to address the regulatory question
independently.”299
The view that federal prosecutors should have a distinct ethics regime
was rejected by the McDade Amendment.300 However, one way to
accomplish ethics rules that are tailored to the needs of federal prosecutors
without completely doing away with the McDade Amendment may be to
allow federal courts to interpret state ethics rules as they apply to federal
prosecutors. This approach keeps the McDade Amendment intact by
applying state ethics rules to federal prosecutors.301 At the same time, it
allows federal courts to use their expertise regarding federal prosecutors,
litigation, and law when interpreting ethics rules and to interpret the rules
with the uniqueness of federal prosecutors and litigation in mind.302
Allowing federal courts definitive interpretive authority strikes a balance
between complying with the McDade Amendment303 and accounting for
the distinctiveness of federal prosecutors, litigation, and law.304

Finding the Appropriate Solution for the Federal Government Lawyer, 44 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 231, 232, 242–44 (2007) (proposing “the creation of a Federal Rules of Ethical
Procedure that would be similar to the previous federal rules projects in the areas of civil
procedure, criminal procedure, and evidence” and “which would be applicable to all lawyers
practicing in federal courts”); Ted Schneyer, Comment, Professional Discipline in 2050: A
Look Back, 60 FORDHAM L. REV. 125, 127 (1991) (supporting the creation of federal ethics
rules).
296. See infra notes 297–99 and accompanying text.
297. For example, Professors Green and Zacharias argue that “Federal courts . . . are
likely to be better regulators of federal prosecutors when there is something distinctively
federal about the regulation—situations in which federal courts have superior access to
relevant information, greater experience in dealing with the prosecutorial conduct in
question, or a better feel for the potential impact of regulation.” Green & Zacharias, supra
note 30, at 426.
298. See, e.g., id. at 426–27.
299. See id. at 430.
300. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2012); see also supra notes 102–08 and accompanying text
(explaining the underlying purposes of the Act).
301. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B; see also supra Part I.A.3 (describing the functions and
purposes of the Act).
302. See supra notes 265–99 and accompanying text.
303. See supra Part II.A.3 (describing the directive and purposes of the McDade
Amendment).
304. See supra notes 265–99 and accompanying text.
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3. State Courts’ Expertise in Ethics Supports State Court Interpretation
While federal courts are expert in federal prosecutors, litigation, and
law,305 state courts have “acknowledged expertise in the area of legal
ethics.”306 One may argue that this expertise in ethics regulation means that
state courts should be definitive for purposes of interpreting ethics rules as
they apply to federal prosecutors.307 Further, states’ expertise in ethics
regulation suggests that state courts are able to tailor ethics rules to account
for the uniqueness of federal prosecutors when necessary.308
Historically, states have always been responsible for ethics regulation.309
Today, states remain largely in charge of regulating attorney ethics,
including federal prosecutors’ ethics.310 States regulate attorneys, including
federal prosecutors, in three primary ways.311 First, federal courts rely on
state courts to determine if applicants to their bar are qualified.312 Federal
courts do not conduct their own bar examinations or character
investigations, but rather require attorneys appearing before them to be
members of a state bar.313 Second, the majority of federal district courts
adopt the ethics provisions of the states where they are located.314 Finally,
federal courts rely on states to discipline attorneys who violate the ethics
rules.315 State disciplinary bodies enforce ethics violations through
proceedings for attorney sanctions and disbarment.316
State courts are also more familiar with prosecutorial conduct than
federal courts.317 Criminal cases are tried in state court far more frequently
than in federal court.318 Therefore, state court judges have more
opportunities to witness prosecutorial conduct that is subject to ethics rules
and to see the impact of these rules on prosecutors and criminal cases.319
305. See supra Part II.C.2.
306. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 63, at 244 n.182; see also infra notes 309–20 and
accompanying text.
307. See infra notes 321–23 and accompanying text.
308. See infra notes 324–28 and accompanying text.
309. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 30, at 419 (“The practice of law historically has
been regulated by the states.”); Andrew L. Kaufman, Who Should Make the Rules Governing
Conduct of Lawyers in Federal Matters, 75 TUL. L. REV. 149, 162 (2000) (“It is appropriate
to recognize the historical lodging of control of attorney behavior in the state systems . . . .”).
310. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 63, at 244 n.182; see also supra Part I.A.1.
311. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 30, at 419.
312. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 63, at 244 n.182; see also Green & Zacharias,
supra note 30, at 419–20.
313. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 63, at 244 n.182; see also Green & Zacharias,
supra note 30, at 419–20.
314. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 63, at 244 n.182; see also Green & Zacharias,
supra note 30, at 420; supra Part I.A.1.
315. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 63, at 244 n.182; see also Green & Zacharias,
supra note 30, at 420.
316. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 63, at 244 n.182; see also Green & Zacharias,
supra note 30, at 420.
317. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 30, at 422 (“State courts are likely to have a
greater familiarity than federal district courts with the professional conduct of lawyers,
including prosecutors.”).
318. See id.
319. See id.
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Additionally, states hold disciplinary proceedings more often, and these
“provide another window into the need for and impact of ethics
regulation—one that is essentially unavailable to federal courts.”320
State courts’ expertise in ethics regulation and greater familiarity with
attorney conduct suggests that state courts may be best situated to interpret
state ethics rules.321 Because state courts are the authority on ethics
regulation,322 they likely best understand ethics rules and their impact on
the legal system. Further, state judges’ greater familiarity with both
prosecutorial conduct and the interplay between this conduct and ethics
rules323 may mean that state judges are better situated to interpret the ethics
rules as they apply to all prosecutors, including federal prosecutors.
Moreover, if one accepts that the uniqueness of federal prosecutors
warrants some form of specialized regulation under the ethics rules and that
the McDade Amendment allows for this through judicial interpretation,324
there is reason to trust that state courts, and not just federal courts, are able
to tailor the rules to the needs of federal prosecutors.325 State courts have
long played a central role in the ethical regulation of federal attorneys.326
Therefore, they understand the ethics issues facing this group.327 This
means that state courts, in addition to federal courts, are likely capable of
interpreting ethics rules with the uniqueness of federal prosecutors in
mind.328
The purposes and policies underlying the McDade Amendment point in
different directions, suggesting reasons to favor both state and federal
courts as the final interpreter of ethics rules.329 The primary purposes of the
Act suggest that state courts’ interpretations should be definitive.330
Despite this, there is an argument to be made that federal prosecutors are
unique such that the ethics rules apply differently to them and that federal
courts can, and should, account for this uniqueness through
interpretation.331 At the same time, state courts are expert in ethics
regulation and attorney conduct, and there is reason to believe that state
320. Id.
321. See id. at 421 (“Given the regulatory tradition assigning state courts the lead in
regulating lawyers, it makes sense for federal courts to accept state law as a starting point for
the oversight of federal prosecutors in their role as lawyers.”).
322. See supra notes 309–16 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 317–20 and accompanying text.
324. See supra Part II.C.2.
325. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 63, at 244 n.182. (“Given their acknowledged
expertise in the area of legal ethics, one would think that states would be well qualified to
draw ethical distinctions between federal and state prosecutors.”).
326. See supra notes 309–16.
327. Cf. Green & Zacharias, supra note 63, at 244 n.182 (“[O]ne could fairly argue that
states have the most expertise in deciding issues relevant to whether state and federal
prosecutors should be treated the same.”).
328. Cf. id.
329. Compare supra Part II.C.1, II.C.3 (describing arguments in favor of state court
interpretation), with supra Part II.C.2 (laying out arguments in favor of federal court
interpretation).
330. See supra Part II.C.1.
331. See supra Part II.C.2.
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courts are also able to specially tailor ethics rules for federal prosecutors
when necessary.332
III. STATE COURTS SHOULD HAVE DEFINITIVE AUTHORITY TO INTERPRET
STATE ETHICS RULES AS THEY APPLY TO FEDERAL PROSECUTORS
State courts should be definitive when it comes to interpreting ethics
rules as they apply to federal prosecutors. As such, federal courts should
defer to state courts’ interpretations of ethics rules. This part explains why
state courts’ interpretations should be regarded as definitive and proposes a
framework for federal courts to defer to state courts’ interpretations.
The plain text and legislative history of the McDade Amendment do not
answer which court system has the final say on interpretation.333 Therefore,
it is necessary to look beyond these sources to the policies and purposes of
the Act.334 The policies and purpose of the McDade Amendment dictate
that state courts are properly regarded as the authoritative interpreters of
ethics rules as they apply to federal prosecutors.
First, reading the McDade Amendment’s directive that federal
prosecutors comply with state ethics rules to exclude state courts’
interpretations of those rules is overly formalistic.335 Such a reading
ignores the centrality of judicial interpretation to the meaning of rules in the
U.S. common law system.336 Although the plain text of the McDade
Amendment only states that federal prosecutors are subject to state ethics
rules,337 the McDade Amendment was really meant to apply entire state
ethics regimes to federal prosecutors.338 This includes state courts’
interpretations of the rules in addition to the rules themselves. To read the
Act any other way subverts its most primary function: to apply state ethics
regimes to federal prosecutors.339
Moreover, regarding federal court interpretations as definitive
undermines the implicit assumptions of the McDade Amendment. The Act
responded to federal prosecutors’ attempts to exempt themselves from
ethics rules and create a specialized set of rules applicable to only them.340
The Act emphatically rejected this, and instead made federal prosecutors
332. See supra Part II.C.3.
333. See supra Part II.A (illustrating how the plain text of the Act does not answer the
question over interpretation); supra Part II.B (explaining that the Act’s legislative history
also does not solve this issue).
334. See supra Part II.C.
335. See supra notes 238–41 and accompanying text.
336. See supra notes 238–41 and accompanying text.
337. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2012).
338. See supra Part I.A.2 (explaining the historical background of the McDade
Amendment); supra notes 99–108 and accompanying text (explaining the purpose of the
McDade Amendment).
339. See supra Part I.A.3 (explaining the function and purposes of the McDade
Amendment).
340. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text (explaining that, through the Reno
Regulation, federal prosecutors attempted to exempt themselves from ethics rules); see also
supra notes 64–90 and accompanying text (summarizing the controversy over the DOJ and
the no-contact rule).
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subject to the same ethics rules as all other attorneys.341 Therefore, implicit
in the McDade Amendment is the idea that there is nothing unique about
federal prosecutors that requires special ethical regulations.342 Regarding
federal courts’ interpretations as definitive as they apply to federal
prosecutors, but not to attorneys generally,343 suggests just the opposite—
that federal prosecutors require special treatment.344 This contravenes the
McDade Amendment’s most basic assumption.345
Most of all, regarding federal court interpretations as definitive thwarts
the Act’s most basic function: to subject federal prosecutors to the same
ethics rules as all other attorneys.346 Federal courts do not definitively
interpret state ethics rules under ordinary circumstances.347 Allowing
federal courts to definitively interpret the rules only as they apply to federal
prosecutors subjects federal prosecutors to a separate and specialized set of
ethics rules—the rules as interpreted by federal courts.348 This turns the
McDade Amendment on its head.349
Conversely, the only policy justification for giving federal courts the
ultimate authority to interpret state ethics rules conflicts with the underlying
purpose of the Act. The primary justification for giving federal courts
definitive interpretive power is that they have greater expertise regarding
federal attorneys, federal litigation, and federal law.350 According to this
justification, federal courts are therefore better able to interpret state ethics
rules as they apply to federal prosecutors.351 This argument, however,
assumes that ethics rules apply differently to federal prosecutors and that
these differences should be considered when applying the rules.352 This is
the very logic that Congress rejected in enacting the McDade
Therefore, the only justification for federal court
Amendment.353
interpretation must fail because it is in conflict with the spirit of the Act.
Even if one believes that the McDade Amendment allows courts to
consider the uniqueness of federal prosecutors when interpreting ethics
rules,354 state courts are perfectly capable of doing so.355 There is no
reason to think that state courts cannot make distinctions between federal
and state prosecutors when applying ethics rules.356 In fact, state courts’
341. See 28 U.S.C. § 530B; see also supra Part I.A.3 (describing the Act); supra notes
102–08 and accompanying text (explaining the purposes of the McDade Amendment).
342. See supra notes 102–08 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 251–52 and accompanying text.
344. See supra notes 245–52 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 102–08 and accompanying text.
346. See supra Part I.A.3.
347. See supra note 251 and accompanying text.
348. See supra notes 245–52 and accompanying text.
349. See supra notes 102–08 and accompanying text (explaining the underlying purposes
of the Act).
350. See supra Part II.C.2.
351. See supra Part II.C.2.
352. See supra Part II.C.2.
353. See supra Part I.A.2–3.
354. See supra Part II.C.2.
355. See supra notes 325–59 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 325–59 and accompanying text.
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expertise on attorney conduct and ethics regulation,357 and the frequency
with which they observe prosecutorial behavior,358 suggests they are
particularly well suited to perform this task. Therefore, there is little merit
to the assertion that only federal courts, with their expertise on federal
attorneys and litigation, can appropriately apply ethics rules to federal
prosecutors.359
Moving beyond the purposes of the Act, there are practical reasons to
regard state courts’ interpretations of ethics rules as definitive. First, state
courts have greater expertise regarding attorney ethics, and this makes state
courts better suited than federal ones to interpret ethics rules.360 Second,
allowing federal courts ultimate interpretive authority is impractical. Under
the McDade Amendment, federal courts may not make ethics rules that
trump state ones.361 If federal courts are given definitive interpretive
authority, a federal court may interpret an ambiguous rule so as to
effectively change it.362 Federal courts should not be allowed to do through
common law interpretation what they cannot do through rulemaking.
Moreover, the McDade Amendment gives the states the ability to regulate
attorney ethics over time.363 This is a fluid process, allowing states to
change ethics rules as needed.364 If federal courts are given definitive
interpretive authority, a federal court may interpret an ambiguous rule and a
state may change that rule in response to the federal court’s interpretation.
The state could continue to revise the rule until the federal court had no
room to change it through its own interpretation. Therefore, even if federal
courts were given ultimate interpretive power, the states would still have
the final say on ethics rules.
In order to properly regard state courts as the definitive authority on
ethics rule interpretation, federal courts should exercise Erie-style
deference365 to state court interpretations, treating them as they do state law
in diversity jurisdiction cases.366 This is presumptively a feasible
framework, because some federal courts did exactly this before the McDade
Amendment was enacted when adopting state ethics rules into their own
local rules.367 It is inapposite that this was not the majority approach
amongst courts that adopted state ethics rules.368 Before the McDade
Amendment was enacted, this deference was not required. However, the
McDade Amendment changed the entire framework for regulating federal

357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

See supra notes 306–16 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 317–20 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.C.2.
See supra Part II.C.3.
See supra note 240 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 240–44 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.A.3.
See supra Part I.A.3.
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
See id. (establishing and describing this framework).
See supra notes 45–47 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.
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prosecutors,369 and this new ethics regime requires deference to state court
interpretations.
When faced with an ambiguous ethics rule in a case concerning federal
prosecutors, a federal court should apply the interpretation adopted by the
state court in its jurisdiction.370 Where the state court has previously
interpreted the ethics rule, the federal court should apply the state court’s
interpretation to federal prosecutors in cases before it.371 This is the same
principal that the Erie372 doctrine requires when a federal court hears a case
through diversity jurisdiction: the federal court applies state substantive
law in matters governed by state statutes and common law.373
Where a federal court is tasked with interpreting a state ethics rule that
the state court in its jurisdiction has not yet interpreted, the federal court
should similarly behave as it would in a diversity jurisdiction case.374 The
federal court should try to ascertain how the state court would interpret the
rule, and it should adopt this interpretation.375 As in diversity jurisdiction
cases, in order to ascertain how the state court would rule, the federal court
should use the sources that the state high court frequently uses to answer
interpretive questions.376 These may include other courts’ decisions,
restatements, academic works, treatises, and policy considerations.377 The
federal court may also rely on trends of the state high court, for example, a
tendency to follow majority rules.378
This framework leaves room for courts to account for the unique role and
needs of federal prosecutors through interpretation of the ethics rules, while
remaining true to the McDade Amendment. Where a federal court
perceives that there is a difference between federal and state prosecutors, it
may make distinctions between the two through its interpretation if the state
court has done so or if it believes the state court would be willing to do so.
This creates the flexibility needed to account for the uniqueness of federal
prosecutors,379 while following the McDade Amendment’s directive that
federal prosecutors are subject to state ethics regimes380 and honoring the
Act’s rejection of a separate regulatory framework for federal
prosecutors.381

369.
370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.

See supra Part I.A.
Cf. Erie, 304 U.S. 64.
Cf. id.
Id.
See id.
See, e.g., Webber v. Sobba, 322 F.3d 1032 (8th Cir. 2003).
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See supra Part II.C.2.
See 28 U.S.C. § 530B (2012); see also supra Part I.A.3.
See supra Part I.A.2–3.
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CONCLUSION
The McDade Amendment was enacted to prevent federal prosecutors
from playing by their own set of ethics rules. The Act also responded to
complaints from the DOJ that federal prosecutors were unsure of which
ethics rules applied to them. Therefore, the McDade Amendment made
federal prosecutors subject to state ethics rules. The Act left unresolved,
however, the question of which courts—federal or state—are definitive for
purposes of interpreting ethics rules as they apply to federal prosecutors.
Because of this, the McDade Amendment falls short of both of its purposes.
First, allowing federal courts to definitively interpret state ethics rules as
they apply to federal prosecutors effectively subjects federal prosecutors to
a separate rule regime—one made up of state rules, as interpreted by federal
courts. Second, it has fostered uncertainty as to which interpretations of the
rules apply, similar to the uncertainty that the Act set out to remedy in the
first place.
In order to honor the spirit of the McDade Amendment and conform to
its underlying purposes, state courts’ interpretations of ethics rules should
be definitive as applied to federal prosecutors. Therefore, federal courts
should defer to state courts’ interpretations of ethics rules in matters
regarding federal prosecutors. Federal courts should do so by exercising
Erie-style deference to state court interpretations. Only by doing so will the
purpose of the McDade Amendment be realized.

